The mechanisms of subnational population growth and decline in New Zealand 1976-2013 by Jackson, Natalie & Brabyn, Lars
Page 22 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017
Introduction: 
This article summarises key findings from the strand of 
the Tai Timu Tangata. Taihoa e? project that examined the 
mechanisms of subnational population change in New 
Zealand for 143 towns, 132 rural centres and 66 territorial 
authority areas (hereafter TAs), for the 37-year period 
1976-2013. Because of space constraints we present the 
information as a set of 10 summary observations. For the 
underlying analyses please refer to Jackson, Brabyn and Maré 
(2016); Jackson and Cameron (2017), Jackson, Brabyn, Maré, 
Cameron and Pool (forthcoming); and Jackson and Brabyn 
(forthcoming).
The broader rationale for the Tai Timu 
Tangata project is outlined by Jackson 
(infra). Essentially, current New Zealand 
has a relatively young and rapidly growing 
population. However, widespread 
subnational depopulation between 1996 
and 2013 saw one-third of the nation’s 
TAs decline in size; Auckland and 12 TAs 
shared 90 percent of growth, while the 
remaining 10 percent of growth was 
spread very thinly across 32 TAs. The 
situation has led to some towns being 
disparagingly labelled as ‘zombie towns’ 
(NBR 2014), and contrasted against their 
more successful growing counterparts. 
With two large cities among those 
declining (Dunedin and Invercargill), and 
structural ageing known to drive a 
reduction in natural increase (the 
difference between births and deaths), we 
wished to better understand why some 
areas are growing and others not. 
Specifically, we wished to know whether 
parts of subnational New Zealand might 
be following their international 
counterparts in declining from what is 
proposed as a ‘new’ and increasingly 
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intractable form of population decline 
(where net migration loss is accompanied 
by natural decrease), as opposed to the 
‘old’ form, where natural increase is 
positive but fails to offset net migration 
loss (Bucher & Mai 2005, cited in Matanle 
& Rausch 2011: 19-20, 46-47). 
The question was not merely academic. 
Globally, population growth is theorized 
to end around the end of the present 
century, but much sooner across the 
developed world (Lutz, Sanderson & 
Sherbov 2004; Davoudi, Wishardt & 
Strange 2010; Reher 2007, 2011, Lee & 
Reher 2011). Reports from newly 
depopulating countries such as Japan are 
largely negative, indicating reduced 
investment in local infrastructure, 
widespread abandonment of schools, 
homes and business, and general social, 
economic and environmental damage 
outside of the main cities; at the same 
time, opportunities arising from a 
potential ‘depopulation dividend’ 
(Matanle 2017) need to be engaged with 
in a timely manner, long before local 
councils and similar agencies are 
overwhelmed with sustained depopulation 
that they have not been anticipating 
(Matanle & Sato 2010; Audirac 2012; 
Martinez-Fernandez, Kubo, Noya & 
Weyman 2012; McMillan 2016).
Indeed, if subnational New Zealand is 
following its international counterparts 
while at the same time being relatively 
youthful and growing strongly at national 
level, we asked if there could be broader 
theoretical implications that would 
contribute to a theory of depopulation, 
and thereby support councils and other 
agencies to plan for this eventuality in a 
more positive way (McMillan 2016).
Because the data we needed for the 
exercise were not available for many 
subnational jurisdictions, or for the 
period required, or on consistent 
geographical boundaries, we had to first 
extract them via statistical means. The 
methodology for creating this unique 
database is briefly described in the 
attached Appendix, with more detail 
available in Jackson et al., (2016). Key 
methodological points are that ‘usually 
resident population’ data for all census 
years 1976-2013 were aggregated to 2013 
geographic boundaries based on Statistics 
New Zealand’s coding. The demographic 
components of change (births, deaths, 
natural increase) for each area were then 
retrospectively modelled using TA-level 
fertility and survivorship rates. An 
estimate of net migration (total and by 
age) was then extracted via the 
conventional residual method (net change 
minus natural increase = net migration). 
The exercise permitted us to develop 
births, deaths, natural increase and 
population by age data, both with and 
without migration. Although the baseline 
data and all rates for modelling have been 
sourced from statistics New Zealand, the 
resulting output has been developed for 
the purposes of this project, and should 
not be seen as official statistics.
Our 143 towns and 132 rural centres 
conform to Statistics New Zealand’s 
‘urban areas’. This means that our ‘towns’ 
range in size from major (>30,000 
people) to minor (1,000 – 9,999 people) 
urban areas, and our ‘rural centres’, from 
300 to 999 people, in terms of their size in 
1976. Under these arrangements, 
Auckland is divided into four zones, 
while data for rural districts is excluded. 
The latter was an unfortunate necessity, 
reflecting the large number of small units 
that would have needed to be analysed; 
however, where possible we note trends 
for the aggregate rural district 
population.
Methodologically it should also be 
noted that each data point carries equal 
Figure 1: Percentage of Territorial Authority Area, Town and Rural Centre 
Populations experiencing net migration gain or loss, 1976-2013
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Source: Jackson and Brabyn (forthcoming). 
Notes: These data were first published in Jackson et al. 2016. Proportions here differ slightly, due to database revisions.
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weight, irrespective of size. This was a 
deliberate choice, in that our research is 
concerned with the extent to which 
individual jurisdictions – all of which 
have implications for such things as rates 
and resources – are affected, rather than 
what proportion of the total New 
Zealand population is affected (Jackson 
& Cameron 2017). For example, TA level 
patterns and trends are of interest to TA 
councils, while those for towns and rural 
centres are of interest to local councils, 
and their respective planners and 
communities. The exclusion of rural 
districts from our detailed analyses 
means that such communities have only 
broad trends on which to deliberate.
One major theoretical conundrum also 
needs to be acknowledged. As outlined in 
the introduction to this Issue, the project 
has been informed by both demographic 
and mobility transition theories. 
Demographic transition theory (Davis 
1945) is a ‘global and national’ level theory 
that essentially treats populations as 
‘closed’, that is, changing only due to births 
and deaths, while mobility theories by 
definition deal with ‘open’ populations 
affected by migration, and are applied sub-
nationally, nationally and globally. To avoid 
getting tangled in theoretical constructs 
(but see but see Pool, infra; Jackson and 
Pool, forthcoming), we proceed here on 
the basis that the New Zealand population 
is in fact both ‘open’ as in mobility theories, 
and is ageing structurally, as theorised in 
demographic transition (following Dyson 
2011).
Following are ten key observations 
drawn from the project. These are 
necessarily brief, but, as noted, more 
formally elaborated in the referenced 
papers. We conclude the article with a 
short summary and consideration of 
related policy implications.
Observation 1: The majority of areas 
experience net migration loss rather than gain
Figure 1 compares the percentage of TAs, 
towns, and rural centres experiencing 
net migration gain or loss from 1976-
2013. The majority of TAs and rural 
centres experienced somewhat greater 
net migration loss than gain at most 
observations. For towns the split was 
typically close to 50:50, although net 
loss was somewhat greater than gain 
between 1986 and 1991, and 1996 and 
2001. Recalling that rural district data 
were not analysed in detail for this 
project, their aggregate suggests a slightly 
different story, with slightly more years of 
gains than losses, and those gains being 
sustained since 2001.
Observation 2: Net migration loss does not 
always result in population decline
Figure 2 shows the percentage of TAs, 
towns and rural centres experiencing net 
migration loss from 1976 to 2013, and 
the percentage actually declining. The 
difference between the two measures 
is accounted for by natural increase 
(births minus deaths), discussed further 
below. On average 59 percent of TAs 
experiencing net migration loss actually 
declined; for towns and rural centres 
the proportions were 70 and 84 percent 
respectively. These data indicate that TAs 
and towns have been more able than rural 
centres to cover their net migration loss 
with natural increase, and conversely, that 
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Figure 2:  Percentage of TAs, Towns and Rural Centres experiencing net migration 
loss, and actually declining, 1976-2013
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net migration loss is a stronger predictor 
of net decline for rural centres than towns 
and TAs.
Observation 3: The majority of areas are 
smaller with, than without, migration
In total, 62 percent of TAs, 66 percent of 
towns and 50 percent of rural centres were 
larger in 2013 than in 1976. However, 
because net migration was often negative, 
a proportion of those growing across the 
period was smaller with migration than 
they would have been without. By ‘with 
migration’ we mean population change due 
to both migration and natural increase; by 
‘without migration’ we mean population 
change due to natural increase only (see 
Appendix). Thus, those growing, but 
smaller than they would have been without 
migration, owe much of their growth to 
natural increase. We elaborate on these 
interactions further below.
The exercise generated three groups of 
interest (Figure 3):
Group 1: Areas that grew between 1976 
and 2013 and were larger with 
migration than without. This 
situation pertained to 26 percent of 
TAs, 39 percent of towns, and 33 
percent of rural centres.
Group 2: Areas that grew between 1976 
and 2013, but were smaller in 2013 
with migration than without. These 
areas experienced periods of net 
migration loss, but it was either 
partially or fully offset by natural 
increase. This situation pertained to 
36 percent of TAs, 27 percent of 
towns, and 17 percent of rural 
centres. In the aggregate it also 
pertained to rural districts, the total 
population of which was larger in 
2013 (513,951) than in 1976 
(398,436), but smaller than it would 
have been in the absence of migration 
(599,218).
Group 3: Areas that declined in size 
between 1976 and 2013, all of which 
were also smaller in 2013 with 
migration than without. In most cases 
these areas experienced natural 
increase, but it was completely offset 
by net migration loss. This situation 
pertained to 38 percent of TAs, 44 
percent of towns, and 39 percent of 
rural centres.
Figure 3:  Percentage of Territorial Authority Area, Town and Rural Centre 
Populations Growing/Declining 1976-2013 by impact of migration on size
Source: Jackson and Brabyn (forthcoming). 
Notes: (1) refers to one rural centre (Waitati) which declined both with and without migration, but slightly less 'with'
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Figure 4:  Percentage of Territorial Authority Area, Town and Rural Centre Populations 
experiencing natural increase or natural decrease, 1976-2013, and projected 
for TAs to 2043
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In sum, migration is not a panacea for 
growth, while growth per se may not 
reflect net migration gain, but rather, be 
the result of natural increase offsetting 
underlying net migration loss.
Observation 4: The majority of areas 
experience natural increase – but this will 
soon change, with profound implications
During the period 1976-2013 the 
vast majority of TAs, towns and rural 
centres experienced natural increase, 
with levels in 2013 slightly higher for 
towns than rural centres (Figure 4, left 
panel). In the aggregate, rural districts 
also experienced natural increase across 
each five-year period. Natural decrease 
thus remains relatively low (right panel). 
However, supporting the main tenets of 
demographic transition theory, which 
hold that the emergence of natural decrease 
is initially ‘incipient’ (intermittent onset), 
47 towns and rural centres (17 percent) 
experienced natural decrease across more 
than one five-year period between 1976 
and 2013, and 22 (8 percent) experienced 
it across five or more periods. In 2013, 19 
towns (13 percent) and 20 rural centres 
(15 percent) were regularly experiencing 
natural decrease; for towns this had 
increased slightly, and for rural centres, 
reduced. These findings reflect those 
for the counties of the United States 
and Europe (Johnson, Field & Poston 
2015), and confirm that New Zealand is 
following its older counterparts, but is as 
yet at a much earlier stage.
Attempting to extend the analysis 
forward, we drew on projections at TA 
level.1 These data show that while natural 
decrease is as yet barely evident at TA 
level, the projections (medium variant) 
indicate that it will be the experience of 
the majority (61 percent) of TAs by 2043, 
and thus of many of the towns and rural 
centres which comprise them (see also 
Jackson & Cameron 2017, and Cameron 
infra). 
Observation 5: There are complex 
interactions between net migration and 
natural increase/decrease
Net migration and natural increase 
or natural decrease interact in several 
different ways to generate three different 
outcomes: growth, decline, and zero 
growth. Our project has identified three 
combinations that generate growth, three 
that result in decline, and two that result 
in zero growth (Jackson, Cameron & Pool 
2015). We refer to these as Types A-C 
growth, Types D-F decline, and Types G 
and H zero growth (Table 1, and Figures 
5 and 6).
For the policy community the typology 
is important because it provides ‘advance 
warnindding end notdg’ of the permanent 
ending of growth (see also Jackson 2014). 
Type A growth, where both elements are 
positive, is more robust than either Type B 
or C growth, where one or other element 
is negative, and is likely to be sustained for 
much longer. In particular, areas growing 
Table 1: Combination of components of change that deliver net growth or net decline
Outcome Combination of Components
GROWTH A: Natural Increase and Net Migration are both positive
B: Natural Increase offsets Net Migration Loss
C: Net Migration Gain offsets Natural Decrease
DECLINE D: Net Migration Gain fails to offset Natural Decrease
E: Natural Increase fails to offset Net Migration Loss
F: Natural Decrease and Net Migration Loss
ZERO GROWTH G: Natural Increase = Net Migration Loss
H: Natural Decrease = Net Migration Gain
Source: Jackson, Cameron and Pool (2015). Notes: By ‘offset’ we mean to ‘completely conceal’
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Figure 5: Percentage of Territorial Authority Areas by Cause of Growth and Decline, 1976-2013, and 
Projected 2013-2043 (Medium Variant)
F: Decline from both negative componentsD: Net Migration Gain fails to offset Natural Decrease
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because of Type B growth, where natural 
increase is completely concealing net 
migration loss, are highly vulnerable to 
decline as natural decrease emerges, and 
their growth should not be seen in the 
same light as Type A.  Type D decline 
(where net migration gain fails to offset 
natural decrease) is more ‘preferable’ to 
Type E or F decline, in that the former has 
a good chance of reverting to population 
growth, at least in the short-term. By 
contrast, Type E decline typically indicates 
that natural increase is becoming very 
low, while Type F decline, the ‘new’ form 
of population decline, foreshadows a self-
reinforcing and increasingly intractable 
type of depopulation. In order to ‘extend’ 
the period covered in our 1976-2013 
analysis to indicate what will unfold for 
towns and rural centres, we include TA 
level projections to 2043 (medium 
variant).
Type A Growth: Across the period 1976-
2013 the majority of TAs and towns 
grew from ‘Type A’ growth, where 
both net migration and natural 
increase were positive, although there 
was an anomalous period, nationally, 
between 1996 and 2001, when this 
cause of growth was overwhelmed by 
Type E decline (see below). The 
percentage of TAs growing from Type 
A growth increased overall across the 
period, from 21 to 41 percent (Figure 
5). For towns, Type A growth 
remained relatively stable, at 38 
percent of towns in 1976 and 37 
percent in 2013; for rural centres, 
Type A growth declined across the 
period, from 30 to just 17 percent of 
rural centres (Figure 6). In the 
aggregate, rural districts also grew 
from Type A growth between 1991 
and 1996, and 2001-2013. The TA 
level projections in Figure 5 show this 
form of growth increasing until 2018, 
then steadily diminishing across the 
period, pertaining to just 17 percent 
in 2043.
Type B Growth (where natural increase 
completely conceals net migration 
loss) declined across the period for 
TAs and towns but increased for rural 
centres. For TAs it pertained to 32 
percent in 1976 and 29 percent in 
2013; for towns, 22 and 17.5 percent 
respectively. For rural centres the 
proportions were 8.3 and 15 percent. 
In the aggregate, rural districts 
experienced this type of growth 
between 1981 and 1991, and 1991-
1996. This type of growth places 
affected areas in a somewhat more 
vulnerable position than Type A 
growth, because as indicated above, 
natural increase is trending 
downwards, and over the next few 
decades will increasingly leave areas 
experiencing net migration loss, 
‘unprotected’. TA projections indicate 
that this form of growth will diminish 
as the proportion experiencing 
natural decrease grows, with Type B 
growth accounting for as few as  
6 percent of TAs in 2043.
Zero Growth
E: Natural Increase fails to offset Net Migration Loss
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Figure 6: Percentage of Towns and Rural Centres by Cause of Growth and 
Decline, 1976-2013
Source: Jackson et al. (forthcoming)
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Type C Growth (where net migration gain 
offsets natural decrease) has as yet 
been the experience of relatively few 
areas, because natural decrease itself 
is as yet not widespread. However, TA 
level projections indicate that Type C 
growth will now become more 
prominent, pertaining to around 20 
percent by 2043, and becoming the 
largest driver of growth and the 
second-largest driver of population 
change. Type C growth may be a more 
robust driver of growth than Type B, 
at least in the short-term, because 
while migration remains positive it 
has a good chance of offsetting 
underlying natural decrease.
Type D Decline (where net migration gain 
fails to offset natural decrease) is as 
yet similarly uncommon, not yet 
experienced at TA level and 
pertaining to less than 3 percent of 
towns and 4 percent of rural centres 
in 2013. TA projections indicate that 
this form of decline will become 
noticeable from around 2028 and 
pertain to around 6 percent of TAs in 
2043.
Type E Decline (where natural increase 
fails to offset net migration loss), has, 
by contrast, been very common across 
New Zealand’s TAs, towns and rural 
centres, although diminishing for the 
former and increasing for the latter. 
For TAs, the proportion fell from 45 
to 29 percent; and for towns and rural 
centres, increased from 27 to 32 
percent, and 47 to 60 percent, 
respectively. Aggregate data for rural 
districts suggests they experienced 
this combination between 1976 and 
1981 only. TA projections indicate 
this form of decline will remain a 
common experience for the towns 
and rural centres which comprise 
them, although will diminish over 
time as it gives way to Type F decline 
(see below). This is the shift from the 
‘old’ form of depopulation referred to 
by Bucher and Mai (2005) to the ‘new’ 
form, where both elements are 
negative.
Type F Decline (where both elements are 
negative) has so far played a minor 
role in New Zealand’s subnational 
population change, albeit more 
evident for rural centres than towns. 
At TA level the combination has not 
yet been experienced. However, 
projections indicate that it will 
become notable at TA level from the 
early 2030s, become the major driver 
of decline, and be the main cause of 
population change per se, by 2043 
– when it will account for around 27 
percent of TAs.
Zero Growth: No cases of zero growth 
were observed at TA level during 1976 
to 2013, although a few came very 
close. It was also a minor cause of 
population change for either towns or 
rural centres. Instead, the long-
theorized arrival of zero growth as the 
‘end point’ of demographic transition 
has been shown in our project – as it 
has internationally – to be a 
transitional stage through which most 
areas pass on their journey from 
growth to decline, and in a few 
temporary cases, vice versa. 
In sum, the TA level projections 
provide advance warning of the ongoing 
impact of structural ageing, with both 
Type A and B growth steadily diminishing 
and Type C growth (net migration gain 
offsetting natural decrease) ultimately 
taking over as the main cause of growth. 
Type D, E, and F decline each grow, with 
Type F decline (both components 
negative) taking over as the main cause of 
decline around the mid-2030s, and of 
population change per se in 2043 (Jackson 
et al., 2016).
Observation 6: The vast majority of TAs, 
towns and rural centres are older as a result 
of migration
Across the period 1976-2013, migration 
caused the majority of TA, town and 
rural centre populations to have older 
age structures than would have been the 
case in the absence of migration (Figure 
7). That is, migration either removed 
young people and/or added older people, 
causing the proportion aged 65+ years 
to be greater than it would have been 
without migration.2
This is known as ‘age-selective’ 
migration (see below), which has also 
been shown internationally to accelerate 
structural ageing as much as the 
conventional driver, low fertility rates 
(Johnson et al., 2015). 
The greatest ‘juvenescent’ (youth-
imparting) impact was for towns, only 15 
percent of which had populations younger 
with, than without, migration. The same 
situation pertained to one-fifth of TAs 
and one-third of rural centres. This means 
that, by contrast, 79, 85, and 66 percent of 
TAs, towns, and rural centres respectively 
were older with, than without, migration. 
Notably this was not the case for New 
Zealand’s rural districts, which, in the 
aggregate, had an almost identical 
percentage aged 65 and older in 2013 both 
Figure 7: Percentage of Territorial Authority Area, Town and Rural Centre Populations 
by impact of migration on structural ageing (as indicated by percentage 
aged 65+ years, with and without migration)
Source: Jackson and Brabyn (forthcoming). 
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with and without migration (13.0 and 
13.1 percent respectively).
Only a minority of TAs, towns and 
rural centres have thus become more 
youthful as the result of migration, a 
finding which, at least in terms of 
international migration, runs counter to 
many governmental pronouncements on 
the issue (see McDonald & Kippen 1999 
and Kippen & McDonald 2000 for a 
refutation of this perception for Australia; 
and Jackson & Cameron 2017 for New 
Zealand). 
Moreover, many jurisdictions are 
decidedly older as a result of migration 
(Figure 8). At TA level, 36 percent had 
populations that were between 20 and 50 
percent older because of migration, and 
31 percent, between 50 and 100 per cent 
older. By contrast, just one was more than 
50 percent younger (Wellington City). 
Almost 30 percent of New Zealand towns 
had populations between 20 and 50 
percent older as the result of migration; 
36 percent, between 50 and 100 percent 
older; and 10 percent, more than 100 
percent older. Rural centres had larger 
proportions than towns that were both 
more than 100 percent older (13.6 
percent) and more than 50 percent 
younger (4 percent compared with 3 
percent for towns), as the result of 
migration. Rural centres also had greater 
proportions in each of the ‘younger with 
migration’ groups. 
Observation 7: Towns are more likely than 
rural centres to have more than 20 percent 
aged 65+ years
The finding of greater proportions of rural 
centres than towns being younger as a 
consequence of net migration is one of the 
more surprising findings of this project. 
We had theorised that rural centres would 
be more affected by the loss of young 
adults and have greater levels ‘ageing-
in-place’, and this combination would 
have caused those areas to age faster. The 
explanation is that while the populations 
of rural centres are, on average, older than 
those of towns (in 2013, 17 and 14 percent 
aged 65+ years respectively), there is a 
greater proportion of towns with more 
than 20 percent aged 65 years (Jackson et 
al., forthcoming, Tables 3 and 4).3 In 2013, 
41 percent of towns compared with 29 
percent of rural centres (and 15 percent of 
TAs) had greater than 20 percent of their 
respective populations aged 65+ years. 
As a result, towns are on the one hand 
currently less likely than rural centres 
to be experiencing natural decrease (as 
noted above, in 2013, 13 and 15 percent 
respectively), but on the other, seeing a 
more rapid shift to that situation. As both 
Pool and Brabyn (this issue) propose, 
tertiary education and jobs are attracting 
young people to the larger cities, while 
lifestyle and amenity factors are attracting 
older people from both the rural centres 
and the larger towns to the smaller towns. 
Observation 8: Age-selective migration is 
accelerating structural population ageing in 
most areas
Figure 9 shows the age distribution of 
migration for the five towns experiencing 
the greatest juvenescent impact of 
migration (left figures) and the five 
towns experiencing the greatest ageing 
impact (right figures). The respective left- 
and right-hand skews clearly illustrate 
the difference in impact. Queenstown, 
Rolleston, Wellington, Arrowtown and 
Central Auckland all gain a disproportion 
of migrants at the younger ages, albeit 
Rolleston and Arrowtown experience 
minor net loss at 20-24 and 15-19 years 
respectively, but this is offset by substantial 
gains of those of parenting age and thus 
also their children – and reinforced by loss 
at the oldest ages. By contrast, the towns 
experiencing the greatest ageing effect 
from migration all see net losses at 15-19 
or 20-24 years, and make their gains at the 
older ages, particularly ‘early retiree’ age. 
The reverse effect from age 75 is also very 
clear, reflecting the classic move many 
older people make ‘back’ towards health 
services and/or family. 
Although not studied in detail, 
aggregate data for rural districts suggests 
an age migration profile that falls between 
the two extremes. On the one hand the 
data show consistent net loss at 15-19 and 
20-24 years, but on the other, in most 
years, net gains at the main parental and 
child ages, offset by net loss at age 65 and 
above. Similar to Rolleston and 
Arrowtown, this combination leads to a 
relatively low percentage aged 65+ years, 
and further indicates that the structural 
ageing of rural districts is primarily due to 
ageing-in-place, albeit in some cases the 
ageing of past migrants, but not direct in-
migration at older ages. 
As also proposed, these migration age 
profiles are typically altered by natural 
increase, both the net difference between 
births and deaths, and change in the size 
of individual cohorts as they age. That is, 
when larger cohorts take the place of 
Figure 8: Percentage of Territorial Authority Area, Town and Rural Centre Populations 
by extent of impact of migration on structural ageing (as indicated by reduction 
or increase in percentage aged 65+ years, with and without migration)
Source: Jackson and Brabyn (forthcoming). 
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Figure 9: Net migration age distribution (percentage of migrants at each age) for the five towns experiencing the greatest youthful 
impact and the five towns experiencing the greatest ageing impact from net migration, 1976-2013
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smaller ones, and vice-versa, the net 
change for those age groups may be less or 
greater than indicated by migration alone. 
However for the most part, it is the 
concentration of migration at either 
younger or older ages, and particularly the 
level of net out-migration around age 15-
24 years, and/or in-migration at 50+ 
years, that determines the ‘speed’ of 
structural ageing. 
Observation 9: The proportion of women 
aged 15-44 is a stronger driver of natural 
increase or decrease than the total fertility 
rate
Conventionally, the shift from natural 
increase to natural decrease is associated 
with a total fertility rate (TFR)4  of less 
than 2.1 births per woman, for around a 
generation (c. 25 years). New Zealand’s 
TFR is still around 2 births per woman, 
although at TA level it ranges from 1.5 
for Queenstown-Lakes District to 3.3 
for Opotiki District (Statistics New 
Zealand 2016). However, reflecting the 
age-selective migration patterns above, 
we found a much stronger relationship5 
between natural increase and the 
percentage of women aged 15-44 years6, 
than with the TFR (Jackson et al., 
forthcoming). Although we have reliable 
subnational TFR data for only three 
observations, our findings concur with 
Johnson et al., (2015: 667-669), whose 
study on the counties of the United States 
and Europe showed that the higher/lower 
the proportion of women at the main 
childbearing ages, the more/less likely it 
is for them to sustain the natural increase 
required to offset migration loss. 
Also important is our finding that the 
national percentage of women aged 15-44 
years (for New Zealand) peaked in 1991 at 
46.6 percent and has since fallen to 39.8 
percent, the latter almost identical to that 
for the USA and Europe. Unless fertility 
rates rise substantially, diminishing 
proportions of women at reproductive 
age mean diminishing birth numbers. The 
proportion of towns with lower than the 
national proportion of women in these 
childbearing age groups increased from 
77 percent in 1976 to 87 percent in 2013 
(+14 percent). For rural centres the 
proportion (lower than the national 
average) has increased from 70 to 90 
percent, accelerating since 2001 (+29 
percent). Rural centres are thus more 
vulnerable than towns to the loss of 
natural increase via decreased births, 
while towns are becoming more 
vulnerable to it from increased deaths.
Mirroring the trends at 15-44 years is 
the equally strong but negative correlation 
between the percentage aged 65+ years 
and natural increase7, indicating that the 
higher the percentage aged 65+ years, the 
lower the natural increase. Although to 
some extent auto-correlated with the 
proportion of women aged 15-44 years, 
this relationship was similarly found for 
the United States and European counties 
by Johnson et al., (2015: 665-666). The 
relationship is somewhat stronger for 
New Zealand’s towns than rural centres, 
reflecting the finding that many towns 
have relatively old age structures, with 
proportions at older ages presumably 
increasing the number of deaths. While a 
greater proportion of towns than rural 
centres have been experiencing natural 
increase, the proportion is falling at a 
faster rate than for rural centres.
Observation 10: Net migration explains most 
of the variance in net change, but natural 
increase determines whether the outcome is 
positive or negative
We found that net migration explains 
around 95 percent of the variance in the 
net population change of towns and rural 
centres across the period 1976-2013. This 
is because natural increase is somewhat 
more even across these jurisdictions, and 
is mostly positive. At the same time, we 
found that natural increase has a relatively 
weak relationship with net change. For 
towns the relationship is negative (the 
higher the natural increase, the lower 
the net change, and vice-versa), but it is 
not statistically significant after 1996. For 
rural centres the relationship is significant 
at only three observations, and it is 
positive (the higher the natural increase, 
the higher the net gain). 
By contrast, the correlation between 
net growth and net migration gain is both 
very strong and positive, and never below 
+0.92 (p=0.01 for all observations, for 
both towns and rural centres). Thus, areas 
with higher net migration gain have 
higher growth – and vice-versa. 
The analysis confirms that net 
migration is the stronger ‘predictor’ of net 
change; however, the foregoing analyses 
demand that a caveat be added: only when 
migration is examined as a discrete 
variable. 
Moreover, another important finding 
from the correlation analysis is that net 
migration and natural increase are 
negatively correlated. That is, the higher 
the net migration gain, the lower the 
natural increase, and vice-versa. For towns 
the correlation is statistically significant 
(p=0.01) at all but one observation. 
Although more modest for rural centres, 
and statistically significant at just three 
observations (p=0.01), the negative 
correlation is a salutary finding, as it 
appears that migration does not 
necessarily mean ‘more births’, as is often 
believed. Rather, it may reflect recent 
trends in the composition of migrants, 
from primarily families, to primarily non-
family workers (students and others on 
temporary visas and/or early retirees 
moving for lifestyle reasons). That is, not 
What has been missing from the debate 
is an understanding of the widespread 
nature of decline across the country, and 
in particular, an understanding that it is 
not limited to small rural towns.
Page 32 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 13, Supplementary Issue – June 2017
only is migration not a panacea for 
growth, but it may further hasten the end 
of natural increase, a finding also noted 
for the United States and Europe by 
Johnson et al., (2015) and for Europe over 
a very long period by Murphy (2016: 239).
Summary and discussion
Over the past few years, population change 
in New Zealand has attracted much media 
and political attention. Areas experiencing 
rapid growth have been contrasted with 
so-called ‘zombie towns’ (NBR 2014), 
the latter usually singling out a few rural 
towns that have experienced precipitous 
decline. What has been missing from 
the debate is an understanding of the 
widespread nature of decline across 
the country, and in particular, an 
understanding that it is not limited to 
small rural towns. Both Dunedin and 
Invercargill cities, for example, are smaller 
now than they were in 1976, despite their 
annual gains of many of the nation’s 
tertiary education students. Also missing 
from the commentary is that in many 
cases, growing towns and rural centres 
are growing only, or largely, because of 
natural increase – the difference between 
births and deaths; this component 
is regularly rendered invisible. Even 
Auckland’s growth has been primarily the 
result of natural increase, accounting for 
58 percent of the region’s growth over the 
past 25 years (Jackson 2016).
The widespread perception of 
migration as the primary driver of growth 
and decline has diverted attention away 
from the all-important population 
replenishing role of natural increase (see 
also Cochrane & Pool, infra, on the critical 
role of Mäori), a deficit that will become 
glaringly evident over the next few 
decades, as natural increase gives way to 
ageing-driven natural decrease. As Brabyn 
(infra) argues, the contribution of natural 
increase to population change has thus far 
been relatively even across New Zealand, 
with the result that migration accounts 
for 95 percent of variation. However, as 
we show in this article, the actual level of 
growth or decline is heavily dependent on 
whether natural increase augments or 
offsets that net migration gain or loss. 
We have shown here that there are 
several combinations of natural increase 
and net migration, three of which deliver 
growth, three decline, and two, zero 
growth. The distinction between the 
growth and decline types is important for 
policy purposes. Type A growth, where 
both elements are positive, is somewhat 
more robust than Type B growth, where 
natural increase conceals net migration 
loss, and the two should not be conflated. 
As natural decrease unfolds, areas 
currently growing from Type B growth 
will become increasingly vulnerable to 
overall decline. Type E decline, on the 
other hand, where natural increase fails to 
conceal net migration loss (the widely 
experienced, ‘old’ type of decline), has the 
potential to revert to Type B growth, if 
migration in those areas turns positive. 
Type E decline is also less perverse than 
the ‘new’ type of depopulation, Type F 
decline, where there is both net migration 
loss and natural decrease. Answering our 
main research question, we found that this 
new, ‘dual’ form of depopulation is as yet 
affecting a relatively small number of New 
Zealand’s towns and rural centres (13-15 
percent), and is not yet evident at TA level. 
However, it is emerging intermittently, 
and projections at TA level indicate that it 
will become increasingly prevalent from 
2028. By 2043 it is projected to affect 
around 27 percent of TAs, and to be the 
largest cause of depopulation and the 
single largest cause of population change 
per se. Type A growth will by then have 
diminished to around 17 percent of TAs. 
Answering our second research question, 
the various combinations delivering 
population growth and decline also do more 
than simply affect population size; they also 
have a profound effect on the age structure 
of each population. Net loss at younger 
ages typically makes age structures older, 
and net gain, younger. Net in-migration at 
older ages further accelerates – or, where 
negative, slows – structural ageing. This 
‘age-selective’ migration has resulted in 
just 15 percent of New Zealand towns 
having populations in 2013 that were 
younger as the result of migration across 
the period 1976-2013; conversely, 85 
percent of towns were older. The latter 
situation also pertains to two-thirds of 
rural centres and four-fifth of TAs. Only a 
minority of our study areas have thus 
become more youthful as the result of 
migration, a finding which, at least in 
terms of international migration, runs 
counter to many pronouncements on the 
topic. Moreover, in many cases areas are 
substantially older (or, in fewer cases, 
substantially younger).
Again, these effects have policy 
implications, as areas gaining young 
adults (especially from internal migration) 
are at the same time playing a role in the 
ageing of the towns and rural centres they 
have left. Akin to ‘watering the neighbour’s 
garden’ (Attané & Guilmoto 2007), future 
policy may need to consider having 
younger/growing areas compensate their 
ageing/declining counterparts. This 
proposition is strongly supported by 
correlations that show the relative size of 
the population of women aged 15-44 
years is a critical factor in sustaining 
natural increase. Second only to the strong 
positive correlation between net migration 
and net change, the correlation for women 
aged 15-44 years and natural increase 
shows that the higher the former, the 
higher the latter. Conversely, the lower the 
percentage of women at these ages, the 
lower the natural increase. This very 
... the question as to whether the 
ending of population growth and onset 
of depopulation will be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
has as yet been subjected to very 
little serious research – or theoretical 
development ...
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strong correlation, which concurs with 
that found for the United States and 
Europe (Johnson et al., 2016), has also 
strengthened over time, and more so for 
rural centres, where the loss of women 
aged 15-44 years is greater than for towns. 
Moreover, the correlation between 
women aged 15-44 years and natural 
increase is also substantially stronger than 
that between natural increase and the 
total fertility rate, for both towns and 
rural centres – although we have only 
three observations on which to base this 
proposition. While also positive, 
indicating that the higher/lower the TFR, 
the higher/lower the natural increase, the 
relatively weak correlation values indicate 
that there is as yet very little relationship 
between the two. Accordingly, we can at 
least tentatively conclude that age-
selective migration is the major driver of 
New Zealand’s current shift to natural 
decrease, rather than the conventional 
driver, low fertility. 
This finding is further supported in 
another, even more surprising finding, 
which shows that net migration and 
natural increase are negatively correlated. 
Although the correlations are relatively 
weak, they are consistently negative and 
indicate that the higher the net migration, 
the lower the natural increase, and vice-
versa – a finding also reported for the USA 
and Europe (Johnson et al., 2015; Murphy 
2016). Migration may thus not be the 
‘bringer of babies’ that many believe. 
These findings are important from a 
migration policy perspective, not least 
because they have implications for the 
ideal composition of international 
migrants; that is, perhaps low growth/
declining areas need more who are likely 
to have families, and fewer merely to 
‘work’, especially in rural centres. 
Similarly, where areas are gaining 
older people, either through migration or 
ageing-in-place, or alternatively are losing 
them to other areas, there are social policy 
implications in terms of the type of 
resources and services that are needed; 
one-size-fits-all policies are to be avoided. 
The same point pertains to areas gaining 
or losing families and children; their 
needs are very different.
In terms of policy development 
regarding structural ageing per se, New 
Zealand’s relatively high birth rates and 
currently very high per capita levels of net 
international migration may suggest to 
some that the ageing-driven ending of 
population growth is ‘over the horizon’, 
and thus may be paid less attention in the 
short term. We emphasise that this is not 
the case at the subnational level (see also 
Matanle 2017, which compares New 
Zealand with Japan). Although the decline 
experienced across the period 1976-2013 
was disproportionately the result of net 
migration loss, that loss and its age-
selective nature has greatly accelerated the 
structural ageing of affected areas. These 
areas will struggle to return to long-term 
population growth, as the increased 
proportions at older ages and decreased 
proportions at reproductive age afford 
little chance of resurrecting the natural 
increase they once enjoyed. As natural 
increase diminishes, more and more 
migrants will be required simply to 
maintain each population at the same 
size. This may happen for popular 
retirement towns, but not most towns. 
Ageing and declining areas thus require 
regionally-specific migration policies that 
give primacy to local, rather than national, 
demographics.
Finally, the question as to whether the 
ending of population growth and onset of 
depopulation will be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ has as 
yet been subjected to very little serious 
research – or theoretical development (see 
Matanle, infra). The end of population 
growth is likely to have both positive and 
negative outcomes – positive, for example, 
in terms of fewer people to consume 
resources and damage the environment, 
and potentially the development of a 
greater sense of community. However, its 
negative outcomes will include the loss of 
many economies of scale that have been 
enjoyed in the growth phase, and plausibly 
the loss of value of many assets, such as 
housing. In New Zealand it will have 
major implications for the way in which 
rate revenue has historically been gathered 
by local government councils (Jackson 
2004; Jackson & Cameron 2017). 
Ultimately the ending of growth and 
onset of depopulation is expected to be 
the dominant situation across most 
countries of the developed world by mid-
century; prior to that our populations will 
age considerably (Atoh 2000; Lutz, 
Sanderson & Sherbov 2004; Reher 2007, 
2011; World Bank 2009; Haartsen & 
Venhorst 2009; Audirac 2010; Lee & Reher 
2011; Matanle and Rausch 2011; 
Martinez-Fernandez et al., 2012, among 
many others). In many cases there is the 
potential for a ‘depopulation dividend’, if 
the situation is accepted and engaged with 
positively and in a timely manner 
(Matanle 2017). Accordingly, it is time for 
our policy makers to begin revisiting our 
policies and the (growth) principles on 
which most are based (United Nations 
2000:4).
1 These and all projections used in this article are based on 
Statistics New Zealand (2015e). They thus predate the 
latest ‘2013-base - 2043 Update’ (2017) projections which 
became available after the article was written. Comparison 
indicates that population growth will be slightly higher in the 
first decade of the projection, but thereafter the outcomes are 
almost identical to those presented here.
2 It should be recalled that both ‘with’ and ‘without’ migration 
includes natural increase.
3 In 2013, the percentage of the usually resident population 
aged 65+ years ranged, for towns, from 3 percent (Waiouru, 
largely a military camp area) to 36 percent (Tairua, a North 
Island east coast beach town), and for rural centres from 0.5 
percent (Burnham Military Camp) to 44 percent (Pauanui, 
also a North Island east coast beach town, immediately 
adjacent to Tairua).
4 The Total Fertility Rate is a ‘synthetic’ measure of the average 
number of children a woman would have across her lifetime 
if she were to experience all of the age-specific fertility rates 
occurring in that particular year.
5 In order to summarise the patterns and trends we examined 
the relative strength of key relationships, by applying the 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient ‘r’ to various combinations 
of the data. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient measures 
the linear strength of the relationship between two arrays of 
data, with +1.00 meaning that each item moved in exactly 
the same direction at the same rate of change (whether 
positively or negatively), and -1.00 meaning that each item 
moved in the opposite direction. 
6 p(0.01) for all observations for both towns and rural centres. 
By contrast the TFR was significant at either 0.01 or 0.05 
for two of the three observations, for both towns and rural 
centres.
7 p(0.01) at all observations for both towns and rural centres.
8 Description: The baseline data was created by Dave Maré 
(Motu Research) under microdata access agreement with 
Statistics New Zealand, MAA2003/18. dave.mare@motu.
org.nz. The tables contain counts of the 1976, 1981, 
1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2013 usual resident 
population by age and sex, grouped by 2013 geographic 
area boundaries (Territorial Authority and Urban Area).  The 
Urban Area classification has been extended to identify rural 
centres (ua13=501) separately (using 2013 Area Unit 
codes).  
9 Disclaimer: Access to the data was provided by Statistics 
New Zealand under conditions designed to give effect to the 
security and confidentiality provisions of the Statistics Act 
1975.  The results presented in these tables are the work of 
the authors, not Statistics New Zealand. They are not ‘official 
statistics’.
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Data Sources and Methodology:
Population data: Mesh-block level counts of the usually resident 
population by 5-year age group (to 80+ years) and sex for all 
census years 1976-2013 were aggregated to the 2013 
geographic area boundaries at urban area (UA) and territorial 
authority area (TA) level8. The allocation to 2013 geographic 
areas was based on a ‘user-derived correspondence’. The 
counts are not official statistics but should be understood as 
experimental estimates intended for use in this research.9 
This exercise resulted in data for 143 urban areas, 132 rural 
centres, and 66 TAs (The Chatham Islands were excluded 
from the TA level analysis because of small cell sizes). 
Birth and survivorship rates for all years for which these data 
were required are not available at urban or rural centre level, 
and were instead constructed using indirect standardisation. 
In order to construct birth rates, we purchased a customised 
dataset from Statistics New Zealand (2016) covering births 
by 5-year age group of mother for the period 1997-2013 
(June years) at territorial authority area (TA) level and 2013 
geographic boundaries. Survivorship (Lx) rates by age and 
sex for each TA were accessed for the years 2005-07 and 
2012-14 (Statistics New Zealand 2015a). 
Calculating missing birth rates via indirect standardisation was 
done in two main steps. First, age-specific fertility rates were 
constructed for each of New Zealand’s 66 TAs for the June 
years 1996-97, 2001-02, and 2006-2013, using number 
of births by age of mother as sourced above, and female 
estimated resident population counts for corresponding 
5-year age groups 15-49 years sourced from Statistics New 
Zealand (2015b).  The age-specific fertility rates for 1996 
and 2001 were then summed and averaged (for each age 
group and each TA), and their ratio to the equivalent rates for 
total New Zealand constructed (drawing on Statistics New 
Zealand 2015c). These relative age-specific fertility ratios for 
each TA were then held constant and multiplied by the 
equivalent rates for total New Zealand for the missing years, 
1976, 1981, 1986, and 1991. That is, the national values 
were retrospectively inflated or deflated by the relevant ratio, 
for each of the four observations 1976-1991, to generate 
approximate TA level age-specific rates for those years. 
The second step involved constructing age-specific 
fertility rates for each town and rural centre, by applying the 
age-specific rates for the TA in which each is located to the 
number of women in each 5-year age group 15-49 years, in 
each town and rural centre.
The resulting birth rates and numbers at TA level differ 
slightly from those published by Statistics New Zealand 
(2015d) because they are constructed experimentally using 
both the ‘estimated resident population count’ (ERP) which 
includes adjustments for births, deaths and migration 
occurring between March and the ERP date (typically June 
or December), and the ‘usually resident population count’ 
(URP) at each five-yearly census (which is taken in March). 
As with the underlying population counts, the fertility data 
should be thought of as best approximations extracted for 
these research purposes. 
Calculating missing survivorship rates via indirect standardisation 
was similarly done in two steps. First, Lx values (the average 
number alive in each age group) by 5-year age group and sex 
for each TA for two Life-Table periods, 2005-07 and 2012-
14, were compared to the average number alive in the 
preceding 5-year age group. This process produced sex- and 
age-specific survivorship ratios for each five-year age group 
to 95+ years, for these two observations (for the purposes of 
this exercise, considered to be 2006 and 2013). The 2006 
ratios were then compared with their national equivalents, to 
generate relative survivorship ratios for each TA for the 
missing years: 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, and 2001. 
That is, for each of those observations, the national values 
were retrospectively inflated or deflated by the relevant sex- 
and age-specific survivorship ratios for each TA in 2005-
2007, to generate approximate TA level rates. 
The second step involved constructing sex- and age-
specific survivorship rates for each town and rural centre, by 
applying the rates for the TA in which each is located, to the 
number of males and females in each five-year age group, in 
each town and rural centre. In order to survive age groups 
above 80 years, the 80+ year age group was prorated to 
80-84, 85-89, 90-94 and 95+ years according to the New 
Zealand distribution (by sex) at those ages. Again, the 
resulting data are ‘best approximations’ based on calendar 
year survivorship ratios and census usually resident 
population counts. 
When the resulting data are compared with published 
birth and death numbers for each TA, which are available for 
all years 1992-2013, there is strong correspondence, and 
the model is thus considered sufficiently robust to use for our 
purposes of calculating the components of change for towns 
and rural centres. This is done using cohort component 
analysis and the ‘residual’ method for separating net 
migration from net change (Rowland 2003 Chapter 12).
Calculating components of change by the residual method: The 
resulting fertility and survivorship rates were used in a 
conventional cohort component analysis to separate out the 
contributing effects of both net migration and natural 
increase. First, survivorship rates for each age group were 
applied to the baseline usually resident population numbers 
for each individual observation (separately by sex), and 
fertility rates applied to survived women aged 15-49 years. 
The resulting births were summed and apportioned male/
female according to the standard sex ratio for New Zealand 
(105 males per 100 females). Births were entered at age 
0-4 years, and all other age groups ‘aged’ by five years. The 
resulting ‘expected’ population by age and sex was then 
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compared to the actual population at the relevant observation 
(for example, the survived and ‘reproduced’ population from 
1976 was compared to the actual population for 1981), and 
the difference at each age (five-year age group) taken to be a 
residual measure of net migration by age across the five-year 
period. Subtracting total estimated migration from net 
change in population size between the two observations in 
turn generates the natural increase component, which in 
turn is disaggregated into its births and deaths components 
by summing each individual component generated at each 
step.
With and Without Migration
To generate the ‘without migration’ data used in our analyses we 
used a standard cohort component projection method, with the 
exception of excluding an assumption for migration. We applied 
period-based age-specific fertility and survivorship rates to the 
1976 population by 5-year age group, separately by sex, adding 
in the resulting births at age 0-4 and subtracting deaths, then 
ageing the population by 5 years. We repeated the process for 
each census year to 2013. These data were then compared with 
those which had been developed similarly, but included 
migration.
